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I. INTRODUCTION
Tommy is a thirteen-year-old foster care child who suffers from
severe autism and functions at the level of a toddler.' Tommy is unable
to speak or care for himself, and he requires constant supervision to
prevent self-inflicted injuries such as hair pulling and scratching. 2
Tragically, Tommy's situation is complicated further by his father's own
debilitating mental health problems: Tommy's father, Mr. Goodall,
suffers from a paranoid personality disorder with obsessive and narcissis-
tic traits.3
In 1999, when Tommy was three years old, Mr. Goodall sought the
assistance of the Washington State Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS or the Department) to help him properly care for his
son. 4  The Department provided Mr. Goodall with services aimed at
instructing parents on how to care for the needs of an autistic child. 5 One
year after beginning services with DSHS, Mr. Goodall asked the
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1. In re Dependency of C.N., No. 58799-4-I, 2007 WL 4489646, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
24, 2007). Although the child's name has been changed to protect his privacy, Tommy's story is
based on an actual dependency action filed in King County Superior Court. See id. at * 1-3.
2.Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *2-3. Two psychological evaluations, in June 2002 and in December 2005, confirmed
this diagnosis. Id. The 2002 evaluation recommended that Mr. Goodall be denied visitation with his
son until he began mental health treatment and demonstrated progress. Id. at *2.
4.Id. at *1.
5.Id.
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Department to place Tommy in foster care. 6 Tommy's first stay in foster
care was short-lived. Upon Mr. Goodall's request, DSHS returned
Tommy to his care less than three months later. The Department
continued providing services to help Mr. Goodall care for his son.8
Despite this ongoing assistance, Tommy was returned to foster care
in March 2003 after a juvenile court declared Tommy dependent.9 The
court concluded that because Mr. Goodall's significant mental health
problems presented a risk to Tommy's health and safety, 10 Mr. Goodall
would be denied visitation until he demonstrated progress in mental
health treatment.1
In 2004, the court ordered supervised visitation between Tommy
and Mr. Goodall in light of Mr. Goodall's "progress with treatment."
'1 2
Although Mr. Goodall had undergone some treatment, subsequent visits
proved highly detrimental to Tommy's emotional and physical health.
13
Mr. Goodall's actions often caused Tommy emotional trauma.14 Despite
numerous warnings from visit supervisors, Mr. Goodall would frequently
make inappropriate comments about how Tommy would die if he
remained with his foster parents. 15 Mr. Goodall also refused to recognize
Tommy's emotional cues, and he was unable to keep Tommy calm dur-
ing visits. He would agitate Tommy by speaking or singing loudly in his
6. Id. It is unclear from the record why Mr. Goodall requested DSHS place Tommy in foster
care.
7. Id. It is also unclear from the record why Mr. Goodall asked for Tommy's return.
8. Id. During this time, a public health nurse filed a report with Child Protective Services
stating that Mr. Goodall was not able to care for his son. Id. The report indicated that Mr. Goodall
was "agitated, paranoid, uncooperative, and constantly complained about deficiencies with virtually
all the services provided." Id.
9. Id. at *2. In the State of Washington, a dependency may be established as a result of paren-
tal abuse, neglect, or abandonment. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.010-810 (2008). When there are
reports of parental abuse or neglect, the state will intervene to protect the child, who is then placed in
the state's custody. See 1 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND
ADOPTION CASES 569 (1983). These children are generally referred to as "foster care children" or
"dependent children." For an in-depth discussion of dependency, see infra Part III.A.
10. C.N., 2007 WL 4489646, at *2. Before the dependency, Tommy had been hospitalized
twice for ongoing manic episodes. Id. at * 1-2. After the first hospitalization, Mr. Goodall refused
to follow the hospital's behavior modification plan for Tommy and took Tommy off all of the medi-
cations he had been prescribed. Id. at * 1. Following the second hospitalization, Mr. Goodall refused
to return to the hospital to take Tommy home. Id. at *2.
11. Id. The court opined that visitation between Mr. Goodall and Tommy would not be appro-
priate until Mr. Goodall was able to understand how his actions negatively affected Tommy. Id.
12. Id. When the court ordered visitation between March 2003 and May 2004, Mr. Goodall's
participation in mental health treatment was inconsistent and sporadic. See id.
13. Id. at *2-3.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *3. There was no indication that Tommy was being abused by his foster parents. ld.
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face. 16 During one visit, several staff members had to restrain Tommy to
stop him from mutilating himself.17
In January 2006, DSHS requested suspension of visitation based on
Mr. Goodall's deteriorating mental health and Tommy's negative reac-
tions to visitation.' 8 The court refused to suspend visitation and instead
imposed certain rules for Mr. Goodall to abide by during visits.' 9 Mr.
Goodall consistently failed to abide by the court's conditions, and as a
result, Tommy's emotional and physical well-being deteriorated even
further.
Following the court's refusal to deny visitation, Mr. Goodall
continued to show a lack of awareness of how his actions caused Tommy
emotional distress, 20 and Tommy's reaction to the over-stimulation
escalated.2' Visit supervisors and social workers increasingly observed
Tommy becoming so hysterical during visits that he would mutilate
himself to the point of bleeding, attempt to flee the visitation room, or
22have a bowel movement in his pants. This inability to cope peaked
during one visit when Tommy "made his nose bleed and then smeared
the blood on himself and the room." 2
3
Visits between Mr. Goodall and Tommy also adversely affected the
24child's physical well-being. Mr. Goodall would bring food to Tommy
during visits despite the visit supervisors' repeated objections.25 Tommy
would then gorge himself, regurgitate, and attempt to re-chew his food.26
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Mr. Goodall's 2005 psychological evaluation revealed that his "mental functioning had
deteriorated to the same point as when dependency was established." Id. This was the same level of
functioning Mr. Goodall possessed when the juvenile court initially denied visitation. Yet the juve-
nile court refused to deny visitation. Id.
19. Id. Specifically, the court ordered that the father
shall not discuss any disputes or perceived wrongs he believes have occurred in the pres-
ence of [Tommy]; refrain from engaging in behavior in front of [Tommy] that has the
effect of escalating [Tommy's] behavior or causing him undue stress; shall not raise his
voice or engage in other agitated behavior in front of [Tommy]; and refrain from using
physical restraint to control [Tommy] in such a manner that obviously escalates
[Tommy's] behavior.
DSHS Response in Opposition to Motion for Discretionary Review at 3, C.N., 2007 WL 4489646
(No. 58799-4-I).
20. C.N., 2007 WL 4489646, at *3.
21. Id. During this time, Tommy's foster parents reported that it would take several days for
Tommy to calm down after a visit. Id.
22. DSHS Response, supra note 19, at 9.
23. C.N., 2007 WL 4489646, at *3.
24. Id.
25. Id. Visit supervisors informed Mr. Goodall that food and water were triggers for Tommy,
and Mr. Goodall was frequently asked not to bring food to visits. DSHS Response, supra note 19, at
4.
26. CN., 2007 WL 4489646, at *3.
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By the summer of 2006, after five additional months of visits with
Mr. Goodall that further damaged Tommy's emotional and physical
health, the court finally agreed that visitation was no longer
appropriate. 27 The court instructed Mr. Goodall to re-engage in treat-
ment and make progress in addressing his psychological disorders before
visitation could resume.28 Mr. Goodall filed a motion for discretionary
review29 to the Washington State Court of Appeals on the grounds that
visitation was impermissibly conditioned on his participation in mental
health counseling in violation of section 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) of the
Revised Code of Washington (Visitation Statute).3 °
Visitation provides some parents, like Mr. Goodall, the opportunity
to continue abusing children who have been removed from the home.
Although there is a presumption that children are no longer in danger of
abuse when taken into the state's custody, Tommy's story, which is by
no means unique, shows that children may still be harmed by their
parents during a dependency. Emotional and physical abuse continues in
the visitation setting due, in large part, to the language used in the
Visitation Statute.
The Visitation Statute provides:
Visitation is the right of the family, including the child and the
parent, in cases in which visitation is in the best interest of the child.
Early, consistent, and frequent visitation is crucial for maintaining
parent-child relationships and making it possible for parents and
children to safely reunify. The agency shall encourage the maxi-
mum parent and child and sibling contact possible, when it is in the
best interest of the child, including regular visitation and participa-
tion by the parents in the care of the child while the child is in
placement. Visitation shall not be limited as a sanction for a
parent's failure to comply with court orders or services where the
health, safety, or welfare of the child is not at risk as a result of the
visitation. Visitation may be limited or denied only if the court
determines that such limitation or denial is necessary to protect the
child's health, safety, or welfare.
31
This language leaves children vulnerable to visitation abuse for three
reasons. First, the "maximum parent and child contact" and "visitation is
the right of the family" language improperly gives primacy to the right of
parents to visitation over the right of children to healthy visitation.
27. Id. DSHS's motion to suspend visitation was supported by the guardian ad litem,
Tommy's mother, four social workers, and Tommy's foster parents. Id.
28.Id.
29. Id. at *3-4. See infra Part V.C.3 for a discussion of the outcome of this appeal.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the Visitation Statute indicates that visitation decisions should
be made in the best interest of the child, the juvenile and appellate courts
often subordinate the child's right to healthy visitation to the
parent's right for maximum visitation.32 Second, the "sanction provi-
sion" 33-the provision barring juvenile courts from suspending visitation
as a "sanction" for a parent's noncompliance with services-allows
parents to continue visitation until there is overwhelming evidence that
the parents' noncompliance with services harms the child.34 Tommy, for
example, was forced into two years of visitation with Mr. Goodall before
the juvenile court felt able to find harm and end visitation. 35 Lastly, the
Visitation Statute does not define "best interest of the child," the
standard juvenile courts are instructed to follow when making visitation
decisions. 36 Without meaningful guidelines, juvenile courts have ren-
dered visitation decisions too often in the parent's favor.37
Because Tommy and children like him should not be forced
into visitation settings that are harmful to their emotional and physical
health, the Washington legislature should amend the Visitation Statute.
This Comment proposes three amendments to the Statute that would
ensure juvenile courts properly focus on the long-term best interests of
children and reduce children's exposure to abuse in the visitation setting.
First, the Visitation Statute should expressly indicate that visitation is a
conditional right of the family and a collaborative endeavor between all
parties involved in a dependency.38 Second, the Statute should rephrase
the sanction provision to allow for the suspension of visitation when a
parent's consistent noncompliance with services adversely affects the
quality of visits. 39 Third, the Statute should define "best interest of the
child" to help juvenile courts make visitation decisions that are consistent
with the child's health, safety, welfare, and other interests.40
To analyze the existing tension between the rights of parents and
the rights of children, Part II of this Comment traces the development of
32. As discussed infra Part V, juvenile and appellate courts view the Visitation Statute as an
attempt to strengthen the parents' visitation rights. See In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App.
1, 17, 156 P.3d 222, 230 (2007).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) ("Visitation shall not be limited as a sanction for a
parent's failure to comply with court orders or services .... (emphasis added)).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. In re Dependency of C.N., No. 58799-4-I, 2007 WL 4489646, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 24, 2007).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii). Neither the Dependency Act nor the Visitation
Statute defines "best interest of the child." See id.; id. §§ 13.34.010-.080.
37. See discussion infra Part IV and Part V.
38. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
39. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
40. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
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family rights and state intervention under Roman, constitutional, and
Washington law. In particular, this Part focuses on the origins of paren-
tal rights, the parens patriae right of states, and the rights of children.
Part III addresses the dependency process in Washington by describing
the typical experiences of children and parents after the initial pick-up
order placing the child in state custody. Part IV presents the typical
benefits and common problems associated with dependency visitation.
Part V introduces the former Visitation Statute and the development of
the current version, and then proceeds to examine the juvenile court's
application of the Statute. Part V also analyzes three visitation cases
from the Washington State Court of Appeals. Finally, Part VI recom-
mends three statutory amendments to help courts render visitation
decisions that better serve the best interest of the child and minimize the
potential for emotional and physical abuse.
II. THE PARENTAL PREROGATIVE AND STATE INTERVENTION:
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF FAMILY AUTONOMY
Juvenile dependency law is designed to respect parental rights
while allowing states to protect the health and safety of children.4' To
develop an understanding of the tension between the rights of the parent,
the state, and the child, this Part begins by discussing the origin of
parental rights. This Part then describes the doctrine of parens patriae
and the state's role in the dependency process. Finally, this Part explains
the child's rights under both federal and state law.
A. The History of Parental Rights
American common law has long recognized that the family, a
sacred social association distinct from public life,42 deserves autonomy.43
This notion of "family autonomy" can be traced to Anglo-Saxon
customary law, Roman law, and Judeo-Christian tradition.44 In particu-
lar, the Roman conception of family has significantly contributed to the
American conception of parental rights.
41. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8
(2d. ed. 2003).
42. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Response to Troubled
and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1305, 1389 (2005).
43. Family autonomy refers to the right of the family-i.e., the parents-to make decisions
regarding control, correction, education, and protection of its members without interference by the
state. See I LYNN D. WARDLE, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY & JACQUELINE Y. PARKER,
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (1988).
44. See id. The principle of family autonomy can be traced back to the Ten Commandments:
"Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy
God giveth thee." Exodus 20:12 (King James).
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Under Roman law, a father's rights to his children and family
autonomy were unequivocal.4 5 The father held absolute dominion over
his children, having the right to sell them into slavery, banish undesirable
offspring, and even kill those born with abnormalities.46 Because the
father's right to family autonomy was absolute, neither the rights of chil-
dren nor the interests of the state could displace it.
Although the Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not address the
rights of parents, several Supreme Court opinions have followed Roman
tradition to develop the contours of a parental rights doctrine. The
American conception of parental rights essentially incorporates the
Roman notion of family autonomy by providing parents with significant
control over their children while protecting parents from unwarranted
intervention by the state.47
For instance, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents have
the right to control the upbringing of their children and that parental
rights are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 In the seminal
case Meyer v. Nebraska, Robert T. Meyer was convicted for teaching
German to a ten-year-old student at the request of the child's parents.49
The State of Nebraska had passed a law that prohibited teachers from
instructing students in a foreign language before the eighth grade.50 The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the Nebraska
law violated the parents' constitutional right to control the upbringing of
their children.5 In reaching its decision, the Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment unquestionably protects a person's right "to marry,
establish a home, and bring up children., 52 The Court further held that
the state may not infringe upon this right unless there is potential harm to
the child. 53
45. HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 163 (5th ed. 2007).
This right included the right to determine the life and death of his children.
46. See I WARDLE, BLAKESLEY & PARKER, supra note 43, at 8.
47. Id. at 13-15. Anglo-Saxon law adopted several of the Roman general principals of family
autonomy by carrying over the Roman traditions of minimal interference by the state and the rights
of parents to rear their children.
48. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
49. Id. Nebraska law required that a child pass the eighth grade before receiving instruction in
a language other than English. See also ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 41, at 15.
50. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
51. Id. at 403.
52. Id. at 399.
53. Id. at 399-400 ("The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect."). Although the
Meyer Court appears to set out a rational basis standard for determining if there has been a due
process violation of the parent's right to raise his or her children, the Court has made clear in later
2009]
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In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed Meyer
and expanded upon parents' fundamental right to nurture and raise their
children.54 The Court has declared that "it is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function ... include[s] preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.",55  The Court has specifically defined the
doctrine of parental rights to include the right to educate, 56 to give
religious training,57 and to have physical custody.58 Family autonomy
and parental rights are treated as fundamental liberty interests and a
subset of the right of privacy under the Court's jurisprudence.59
In justifying a rich parental rights doctrine, the Supreme Court has
explained that the notion of parental rights should be respected by the
law because of two presumptions: (1) parents possess what children lack
in areas of functioning, and (2) parents' love and affection for their
children generally causes parents to act in their children's best interests.
6°
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also recognized that when one or
both of these presumptions are rebutted, the state has a compelling right
to intervene in the family relationship.61 Parental rights, therefore, are
not entitled to absolute protection, and the rights of the child should
prevail when parents no longer act in the child's best interest.
B. Justifying State Intervention with the Parens Patriae Doctrine
When a parent does not act in the child's best interest and the
child's health, safety, and welfare are at stake, the state may intervene
and act "in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care
opinions that governmental interference with family autonomy is subject to strict scrutiny. See also
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, 753; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
55. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. In Prince, a guardian of a nine-year-old girl was convicted for
violating Massachusetts child labor laws. Id. at 160. The guardian had allowed the child to distrib-
ute religious literature in a downtown area. Id. at 162. Although reaffirming Meyer by recognizing
that parents have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, the Court upheld the
Massachusetts' law and the guardian's conviction because the state had a compelling interest to
regulate the actions and treatment of children. Id. at 163-64, 166. The Court held that parental
rights are not absolute and may be restricted to protect the best interest of the child. Id. at 166.
56. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
57. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
58. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
59. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
60. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
61. Id. at 603 (holding that when a child's physical or mental health is jeopardized, a state has
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with the child).
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for themselves. 62 Like the parental rights doctrine, the right of state
intervention-the parens patriae power--originated from Roman juris-
prudence, which recognized the Roman emperors as the ultimate parents
of the country.63 Toward the end of the Roman Empire, the law's former
conception of the family as having an absolute sphere of autonomy
evolved into a more complex model allowing for some state interven-
tion. 64 The Roman emperors severely curtailed the former absolute
rights of fathers, primarily by abolishing the father's right to determine
the life and death of his children. 65 Additionally, Roman law recognized
the family as a "fundamental social cell" deserving of some state protec-
tion.66
In early American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court acknowledged
67that the states possessed the parens patriae power. Because, however,
the presumption in favor of family autonomy still reigned supreme, the
Court limited the states' use of the parens patriae power. The Supreme
Court's precedent created a legal presumption that parents were gener-
ally fit to raise and care for their children. 68 The states could exercise
the parens patriae power and interfere with the parent-child relationship
69only upon a showing of parental unfitness or child endangerment.
The Supreme Court examined the proper role of state intervention
in Stanley v. Illinois.70 The children of Mr. Peter Stanley, an unwed
father, were removed from his care upon the death of their mother.71
Although the Court reversed the dependency because the father had not
been provided a hearing to demonstrate his fitness,72 the Court noted that
Illinois' dependency process did not violate the Constitution when due
process was satisfied.73 The Court held that states have a right and duty
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (8th ed. 2004).
63. See id.
64. See 1 WARDLE, BLAKESLEY & PARKER, supra note 43, at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id. This notion was later adopted by the English Crown, which authorized the government
to protect members of the landed gentry deemed unable to care for themselves. See ABRAMS &
RAMSEY, supra note 41, at 8.
67. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57 (1890) (holding that the parens patriae authority is inherent in the power of every state).
68. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 588-89 (1877) ("Parents
are entrusted with the custody of the persons, and the education, of their children; yet this is done
upon the natural presumption, that the children will be properly taken care of, ... and that they will
be treated with kindness and affection. But, whenever.. . a father ... acts in a manner injurious to
the morals or interests of his children; in every such case, the Court of Chancery will interfere.").
69. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
70. Id.
71. Id at 646.
72.Id.
73. Id. at 649.
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to protect children through a dependency proceeding.74 Further, the
Court noted that the state's interest "to protect the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor" is legitimate and within the
75state's police power.
In summary, the parens patriae power, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, gives the state broad authority to act in the child's best
interest. 76 This power encompasses the state's right to remove a child
from parental custody and make the child a dependent of the state when
the child's safety or welfare cannot be adequately protected within the
familial home.77 As discussed later in the Comment, this parens patriae
authority also justifies the state's limitation of visitation when a child's
health, safety, or welfare are at risk.78
C. Children's Rights under the U.S. Constitution and
Washington Statutory and Common Law
Juvenile dependency law can be viewed as a struggle between the
right of parents to maintain family autonomy and the right of the state to
intervene and protect the interests of a child in cases of abuse and
neglect. Little attention, however, is paid to the affirmative rights that
children have in the dependency context.
The Supreme Court's incoherent view of children is the main
reason for a minimal children's rights doctrine: "The law views children
as vulnerable, incapable and needing protection in some circumstances,
but as holding constitutional rights, decision-making ability and personal
responsibility in others. A person may be a child for one purpose, but an
adult for another.",79 Additionally, the Court's fervent protection of
parental rights and parental autonomy has restrained the Court from
shaping a more developed children's rights doctrine.80
Despite its focus on parental rights, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that children possess some rights with respect to their relationship
with their parents. 8' The Court has specifically recognized a child's right
to food, shelter, clothing, protection, education, and medical care; yet the
74. Id. at 652.
75. Id.
76. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (holding that the state has a wide range
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in matters affecting the child's welfare).
77. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.
78. See discussion infra Parts V-VI.
79. SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7
(2001).
80. Id. at 33.
81. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & ALAN SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK 113 (1985).
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Court typically refers to these "rights" as duties owed to children by their
parents.82 One of the more important rights possessed by children is the
right not to be abused or neglected by their parents-or put more
accurately, the parents' duty not to harm their children. 8' This right not
to be harmed is directly intertwined with the state's parens patriae right.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not delineated the proper balance
between the rights of children and the competing rights of
parents during a dependency and in the visitation context.8 4
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington courts tend to focus on
the role of the state in protecting children. For instance, Washington
common law has reaffirmed the state's right to protect children through
the use of the parens patriae power.85 In In re Sego, the Washington
State Supreme Court held that, despite parents' fundamental liberty
interest in the care and custody of their children, the state has an equally
compelling interest in protecting children from physical, mental, and
emotional harm. 86 By recognizing the state's parens patriae power,
Washington courts implicitly acknowledge the fundamental right of chil-
dren not to be abused or neglected by their parents.
The Washington legislature has defined more affirmatively the
rights of children in the dependency setting.8 7 The Juvenile Court Act in
Cases Relating to Dependency of a Child and the Termination of a Parent
and Child Relationship (Dependency Act) 88 recognizes that children have
a right to basic nurturing, which includes the right to a safe, stable, and
permanent home and a speedy resolution of the dependency
proceeding. 89 The Act also acknowledges that dependent children have a
right to maintain familial bonds by requiring frequent visitation
between children and their parents. 9° Moreover, the Act attempts to rec-
ognize the health and safety rights of children during a dependency. The
Visitation Statute, in particular, provides that visitation may be granted
82. Id. ("Generally, it is the responsibility of a child's parents or custodians to provide him
with the necessary attributes of life. When they fail to fulfill these responsibilities or prevent a child
from receiving them, they may be charged with child abuse or neglect.").
83. Id.
84. See RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 79, at 33. In Washington, the legislature has
attempted to find the proper balance by implementing a "best interest of the child test" in the
visitation setting. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008).
85. See In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 738, 513 P.2d 831, 832 (1973); In re Dependency of
H.W., 70 Wash. App. 552, 555, 854 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1993).
86. 82 Wash. 2d at 738, 513 P.2d at 832.
87. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020.
88. Id. §§ 13.34.010-.810.
89. Id. § 13.34.020; see also In re Welfare of H.S., 94 Wash. App. 511,530, 973 P.2d 474, 485
(1999).
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii).
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only when visitation is in the child's best interest. 91 Finally, the Depend-
ency Act is unique in that it expressly places the rights of the child above
the rights of the parents: when the rights of parents and the rights of the
child conflict, "the rights and safety of the child should prevail.
92
Because children are often unable to exercise the rights listed above
on their own, the Washington legislature has also recognized dependent
children's right to have a guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed to protect
and advocate for their best interests during the dependency process.
93
The GAL is required to investigate the child's situation, report factual
information to the court regarding the best interest of the child,
and monitor the parents' compliance with services.94 Additionally, the
Dependency Act charges the GAL with the duty to represent and
advocate for the best interest of the child.95
The Washington legislature has come far in attempting to protect
and secure a child's best interest. As Tommy's story indicates, however,
the legislature has not gone far enough. Although the Dependency Act
incorporates and expands upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of
children's rights, the legislature has failed to provide specific guidance to
juvenile courts on the proper balance between the rights of parents and
the rights of children. In particular, the current language and interpreta-
tion of the Visitation Statute undermines the legislature's goal of
protecting children's rights over the rights of parents.
III. JUVENILE DEPENDENCY IN WASHINGTON: THE TYPICAL
EXPERIENCES OF FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
For thousands of families in Washington, the dependency process is
an emotionally challenging experience in which children are uprooted
from their homes. When a child is abused or neglected, as was the case
with Tommy, the State of Washington has a right to intervene in the
family relationship to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the
child. 96 Washington's dependency laws attempt to balance parents'
constitutionally protected right to the custody and care of their children
and the state's right to protect children from harm. In addition to protect-
ing children from harm, the secondary purpose of dependency is to im-
91. Id.
92. Id. § 13.34.020.
93. Id. § 13.34.100(1). If a child is represented by an attorney in dependency proceedings, then
the appointment of a guardian ad litem is at the discretion of the court.
94.Id. § 13.34.105.
95. Id. § 13.34.105(1)(e). It is important to note that a GAL is not required under the statute to
inform the court of the child's wishes regarding placement.
96. See discussion supra Part II.B-C.
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prove parental deficiencies through state intervention. 97 In Washington,
this balance is effectuated by the Dependency Act.
98
This Part describes what families experience in the dependency
process, from the initial pick-up order removing the child from the home
to the end of the dependency (via reunification or termination of parental
rights). Additionally, this Part discusses the specific duties and rights
held by parents.
A. The Dependency Process
The dependency process in Washington is initiated when DSHS re-
ceives a report that a child has been abused, neglected, or abandoned.99
Upon receiving a report of abuse, DSHS assigns a social worker to
investigate the allegations.100 The social worker may file a dependency
petition with the juvenile court'0 1 to remove the child from the family
home 10 2 if the child is in immediate danger and if there appears to be
merit to the allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.'0 3 The court
may then order law enforcement, a probation counselor, or DSHS to take
the child into custody upon finding that the child's health, safety, and
welfare will be seriously endangered if he or she is not removed from the
97. Kathleen Haggard, Treating Prior Terminations of Parental Rights as Grounds for Present
Terminations, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1998).
98. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.010-.810.
99. Id. § 26.44.010. DSHS often receives reports of child abuse from concerned family mem-
bers, friends, or neighbors. A report of child abuse can also be filed by the police department or by
hospital staff. See id. § 26.44.050 (providing the procedures that law enforcement must follow when
placing a child into protective custody); id. § 26.44.056 (providing the procedures the hospital must
follow when placing an administrative hold on a child).
100. Given the importance of family autonomy, the social worker will provide preservation
services if the child is not found to be in immediate danger; the parents will then be asked
to enter into a voluntary service contract with DSHS to correct any parental deficiencies. See id
§ 74.14C.005. These contracts typically require the parents to agree to engage in services, stop
dangerous behaviors, and allow social worker visits. So long as the parents comply with the contract
and there is no imminent threat of danger in the home, the children will continue to reside with the
parents.
101. The juvenile court retains jurisdiction throughout the dependency. When a petition for
termination of parental rights is filed, jurisdiction resides with the superior court.
102. See § 13.34.040.
103. Id. § 13.34.030(5)(a)-(c); see also id. § 26.44.020(1) (defining "abuse or neglect" as
"sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or injury of a child by any person under circumstances that cause
harm to the child's health, welfare, or safety, excluding conduct permitted under [Washington
Revised Code section] 9A. 16.100; or the negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child by a person
responsible for or providing care to the child"); id. § 13.34.030(1) (defining "abandoned" as when
"the child's parent, guardian, or other custodian has expressed, either by statement or conduct, an
intent to forego, for an extended period, parental rights or responsibilities despite an ability to
exercise such rights and responsibilities").
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home. 10 4 The child's parents must be served with a copy of the depend-
ency petition and any supporting documentation.
10 5
The juvenile court is required to conduct a fact-finding hearing
within seventy-five days of the filing of a dependency petition to
determine whether the child is dependent within the meaning of Wash-
ington Revised Code section 13.34.030. 106 The petitioner, typically
DSHS, bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child is dependent. 0 7 In determining whether a child is
dependent, the court may consider the parent's history of involvement
with Child Protective Services or law enforcement agencies; the parent's
inaction with regard to the child's health, safety, or welfare; and the
efforts of DSHS to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child
from the family home. s08 Following this fact-finding process, the court
must conduct a disposition hearing within fourteen days of entering its
order. 109 If the child is found to be dependent, then the court will order
the placement of the child, 1° the appropriate services for the family,"'
and the amount and type of visitation.
112
The familiar association with children being "stuck in foster care
limbo" occurs at this point: after dependency but before termination of
parental rights or reunification. Children typically remain in dependency
for two to five years. 1 3 The dependency process can last for years for
104. See id. § 13.34.050(1).
105. See id. § 13.34.050(3). Upon removal from the home, the child is immediately placed in
shelter care. See id. § 13.34.060. DSHS is required to inform the parents of the reasons for remov-
ing the child from the home, the parents' rights under Washington statutes, and the process for
protecting parental interests. See id. § 13.34.062(l)(a). For the stock notice form given to parents,
see id. § 13.34.062(2)(b).
The child may remain in shelter care for seventy-two hours, after which time the parents are
entitled to a shelter care hearing to determine the placement of the child. Id. § 13.34.062(I)(a). At
the shelter care hearing, the court must determine whether the child can be safely returned home
during the pending dependency action. Id. § 13.34.065(l)(a). For more information concerning the
shelter care hearing, see id. § 13.34.065.
106. Id. § 13.34.070.
107. Id. § 13.34.110(1).
108. Id. § 13.34.110(2). Parents may waive their rights to a fact-finding hearing by signing an
agreed order of dependency; however, entry of an agreed order is an admission that the child is
dependent within the meaning of the statute. Id. § 13.34.110(3)(c)(iii). Before the court will enter
the agreed order, parents are required to establish on the record that they understand that the agreed
order will satisfy one of the elements required to terminate parental rights. See id.
109. Id. § 13.34.110(4).
110. See id. The court will determine whether the child should be placed with a parent, a rela-
tive, or in foster care. Id. If the child cannot be placed with the parent due to a risk of harm, the
preference in Washington is for the child to be placed with the relative. Id.
11l. Id. § 13.34.136(2)(b)(i).
112. Id. § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii).
113. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Social Worker, Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., in
Lynnwood, Wash. (Nov. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with DSHS Social Worker]. During this
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several reasons: (1) the parent fails to comply with services in a timely
manner, and therefore it is not safe for the state to return the child to the
family home; (2) the severity of the parent's deficiencies requires years
of treatment before the child can be returned home; or (3) the parent has
periods of improvement followed by periods of regression that delay re-
unification or termination of parental rights.'
14
The dependency ends upon the occurrence of two possible events:
reunification' 15 or termination of parental rights.' 16 Reunification occurs
when the court has found that the parent has sufficiently corrected any
parenting deficiencies so that the child can safely be returned home.'17
Termination occurs when the court has found that termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the child and parental deficiencies cannot
be corrected in the foreseeable future. 118 Upon terminating parental
rights, the child becomes eligible for adoption.
B. The Rights and Duties of Parents with Dependent Children
Although the best interest and safety of the child are the main focus
of a dependency, the Dependency Act provides parents with several
rights and obligations. First, parents have a right to visitation with their
children. 19 In out-of-home dependencies, visitation is fairly uniform for
most families: juvenile courts typically order visitation between the par-
ent and child once per week for one to three hours.1 20 Parents visit with
period, the court conducts a review to determine if the current or permanent placement plan should
be changed, if services should be ordered, and if visitation should be limited or expanded. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136.
114. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.138(2)(a).
116. Seeid. § 13.34.132.
117. Id. § 13.34.138(2)(a).
118. Id. § 13.34.180(l)(a)-(f). The court will grant the termination of parental rights if:
(a) the child has been found to be a dependent child; (b) the court has entered a dispositional
order; (c) the child has been removed from the home for a period of at least six months; (d)
services have been offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capa-
ble of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been offered or
provided; (e) there is little likelihood that parental deficiencies will be remedied so that the
child can be returned to the parent in the near future, considering whether (i) use of drugs or
alcohol render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child and there is a docu-
mented unwillingness of the parent to receive and complete treatment or (ii) psychological
incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent is so severe and chronic as to render the parent
incapable of providing proper care for the child and there is a documented unwillingness of the
parent to receive and complete treatment; and (f) continuation of the parent and child relation-
ship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent
home. Id.
119. Id. § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) ("Visitation is the right of the family, including the child and the
parent, in cases in which visitation is in the best interest of the child.").
120. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
Seattle University Law Review
their children at a DSHS office and are supervised by visit supervisors.
121
During visitation, parents are encouraged to interact with their children
in an age-appropriate manner, which includes playing with toys, discuss-
ing the child's schoolwork, and bringing the child snacks.
22
Second, parents have a right to participate in permanency planning
to determine the future placement plan for their child. 23 During perma-
nency planning, parents have the opportunity to discuss their progress in
addressing parental deficiencies and to comment on whether they desire
reunification.
Third, parents have an obligation to comply with services to correct
the deficiencies that led to dependency. 24 Given the broad range of pos-
sible parental problems, DSHS offers the following services: mental
health counseling, substance abuse treatment, parenting classes,
psychological evaluations, anger management classes, developmental
disabilities services, housing services, and domestic violence treat-
ment. 125 Parents may be granted reunification only upon showing that
their parental deficiencies have been corrected.
126
IV. To VISIT OR NOT TO VISIT: THE PROS AND CONS OF VISITATION
Courts, attorneys, GALs, and child psychologists agree that
visitation is an important component of dependency and is beneficial to
both the parent and child. 127 As Tommy's story reveals, however, visita-
tion may provide an opportunity for parents to abuse their children.
128
This Part first describes the benefits of visitation for the child, the




123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(1).
124. See id. § 13.34.180(1)(d), (e)(i)-(ii).
125. DEPENDENCY & TERMINATION EQUAL JUSTICE COMM. REPORT 15 (2003), available at
http://www.opd.wa.gov/Reports/Dependency/o20&%2OTermination%2OReports/2003 %20DTEJ%2
OReport.pdf [hereinafter DTEJ COMM.].
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.138(2)(a).
127. See, e.g., DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19. The DTEJ Report was prepared by a
multi-disciplinary group of judges, legislators, DSHS representatives, an assistant attorney general,
parents' attorneys, and other professionals involved in dependency and termination cases. See also
Margaret Smariga, Visitation with Infants and Toddlers in Foster Care: What Judges and Attorneys
Need to Know, PRAC. & POL'Y BRIEF (ABA Ctr. on Children & Law, Wash. D.C.), July 2007, at 1,
available at http://www.abanet.org/child/policy-brief2.pdf.
128. See discussion supra Part I.
[Vol. 32:769
Putting Children Last
A. Visitation as a Tool in Bringing About Reunification
During dependency, visitation is important to three groups: parents,
dependent children, and the courts that make visitation decisions. First,
visitation is important to dependent children.12 9 Regardless of the cir-
cumstances, dependent children are harmed by the disruption of the
parent-child relationship during the dependency process. Visitation can
minimize the emotional harm that dependent children suffer from being
separated from their parents by providing children opportunities to
maintain and restore familial bonds.1 30 Visitation also allows children an
opportunity to form a more appropriate parent-child relationship under
supervision by visit coordinators.13
1
Second, visitation is crucial for parents. 132 Visitation allows the
parents to lessen the pain of separation by remaining a part of the child's
life. 133 Visitation provides the parents opportunities to hear about the
child's day-to-day life and stay abreast of the child's development.1 34
Moreover, visitation is an opportunity for parents to practice parenting
skills and receive coaching from visit supervisors. 35 Visitation is also
essential for the parents' motivation. 136 By having continued contact
with the child, parents are able to keep the hope alive that their child will
be returned home after they have fully addressed their parental
deficiencies.
Finally, visitation is a critical tool for the courts in assessing
whether reunification is possible. 137 The nature of the parent-child
interaction during visitation will inform the court of the family's progress
or of the parents' inability to correct deficiencies.1 38 Without visitation,
it would be more difficult for the court to assess if the parents are able to
incorporate what they have learned through services into parenting their
children and if reunification is a desirable outcome.
129. DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
130. Smariga, supra note 127, at 1, 5.
131. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
132. DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
133. Smariga, supra note 127, at 6.
134. This is especially true for younger children (infants and toddlers) who develop more
quickly than adolescents.
135. Smariga, supra note 127, at 6.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 20. In reviewing a visitation order, the court should look at: whether the current
visitation plan allows an attachment to form between the parent and child, whether the visitation
allows the parent an opportunity to "parent", what the start and end of visits look like (parent and
child responses), and whether the permanency plan is moving toward reunification. Id.
138. Id. at6.
2009]
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B. The Dangers of Visitation
Although visitation between parents and their dependent children
often helps reunification, visitation is not always beneficial and may pre-
sent serious negative ramifications for the children. 39 First, visitation
may harm the child when parents engage in behavior that is
emotionally or physically abusive. 40 Parental conduct that is likely to
result in emotional abuse includes: false promises that the child will
return home soon, comments blaming the child for the dependency, or
unsubstantiated accusations that the child is being abused in foster
care. 141 The parents may also engage in inappropriate conduct that,
although not directed at the child, can have an adverse effect on the
child's well-being. For example, a child can suffer emotional harm when
parents yell at the social workers during visits. 142  Instead of a visit
focused on the parent and child, the visit becomes a battle between the
visit supervisor and the parents. 143 Visitation is inappropriate in these
situations because the visits no longer satisfy the purposes for which they
were intended: strengthening the parent-child relationship.
Second, visitation can also prove harmful to the child when parents
are unwilling to work with visit supervisors or respond to their child's
needs.1 44 In this situation, not only will the parents fail to heed visit
supervisor warnings regarding inappropriate interaction with the child,
but parents will also ignore advice regarding appropriate interaction with
the child. 145 Parents who refuse or are unable to respond to their child's
cues-such as crying, acting out, or withdrawing-may subject the child
to neglect or emotional abuse.146 For instance, Tommy would repeatedly
sign "NO" to his father or would try to flee the room when Mr. Goodall
sang or talked loudly near his face. 147 Mr. Goodall would frequently
139. See discussion supra Part I.
140. Smariga, supra note 127, at 9.
141. Peter G. Jaffe et al., Courts Responding to Domestic Violence: Parenting Arrangements
after Domestic Violence, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 81, 85 (2005) (discussing the
effect of domestic violence after the children have been removed from the perpetrator). When per-
petrators of domestic violence feel unjustly blamed by the system, they may rationalize their
behavior to their children or place blame on the children or on the other parent. This ongoing expo-
sure to inappropriate topics of conversation constitutes a form of ongoing emotional abuse that af-
fects children's sense of emotional security. Id.
142. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
143. Id Visits between Tommy and Mr. Goodall were often harmful to Tommy because Mr.
Goodall refused to listen to visit supervisors, and Mr. Goodall was unable to respond to Tommy's
needs for less anxiety. See discussion supra Part 1.
144. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
145. Id.
146. Id.




ignore these cues from Tommy, and in response, Tommy would become
so agitated that he would engage in self-mutilation or other acts exhibit-
ing severe distress and anger.
148
Third, visitation may be harmful when the parents' deficiencies are
readily apparent to the child during visits. 149 A parent's substance abuse
or mental health problems are often perceptible to children even during a
brief visit. 150  For example, a child may be exposed to erratic and risky
adult behavior such as hallucinations and paranoia when parents are not
getting treatment. 151 Moreover, parents with these heightened deficien-
cies are often unable to respond to their child's cues, including the need
for a warm and responsive interaction.' 52
Finally, visitation can be harmful to the child when the parents do
not visit consistently. 153 Inconsistent visits are harmful to the child
because they increase the child's sense of separation, confusion, and
abandonment. 154 More importantly, inconsistent visits do not enable the
parents and the child to bond. 55 The effect of harmful visitation on chil-
dren is often evident. 5 6 Some children will refuse to visit with their par-
ents. 157 Other children will emotionally shut down and fail to respond
148. 1d. During one visit when Mr. Goodall ignored Tommy's cues, Tommy "tried to drink
hot water out of the bathroom faucet and yanked window blind rods off and started waving them
around." Id.
149. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
150. Id. According to the social worker, children as young as three can perceive parental defi-
ciencies. Although a young child may not be able to pinpoint the source of the deficiency (for
example, substance abuse or mental health issues), the child can tell "something is not quite right."
Because dependent children are often exposed to a more stable environment in foster care, the
parents' behavior may seem wrong or inappropriate.
15 1. Brynna Kroll, A Family Affair? Kinship Care and Parental Substance Misuse: Some
Dilemmas Explored, 12 CHILD & FAMILY Soc. WORK 84, 88 (2007) (discussing the effect of paren-
tal substance abuse on children). This is not to say that all parents with mental health and substance
abuse problems are not fit to visit their children. Instead, those parents who have severe problems,
refuse treatment, and expose their children to harm should have the appropriateness of their visita-
tion orders carefully examined by the court.
152. Id. at 88. This may include a failure to communicate with the child, play with child, or
show affection. [Id.]
153. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
154. Id.
155. Id. According to the social worker, parents with untreated substance abuse or mental
health problems are more likely to not visit or visit inconsistently. See also Kroll, supra note 151, at
88 ("[Substance abuse] ... can render parents psychologically unavailable, inconsistent..., less
sensitive to children's signals, needs and overall welfare, and often actually physically absent be-
cause of the demands that obtaining substances may make." (emphasis added)).
156. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
157. Id. In In re Dependency of T.H., 139 Wash. App. 784, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007), the child
refused to visit with the mother following several emotionally traumatizing in-person visits; the
juvenile court suspended visitation until the child wished to renew contact with his mother. Id. at
787, 162 P.3d at 1142.
2009]
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throughout a visit.1 58 Children like Tommy may flee the room, act out in
rage, or engage in self-mutilation.159 The effects of a bad visit with the
parents can also be seen after the visit has ended. 160 Normally calm chil-
dren may exhibit increased emotional outbursts following unsuccessful
visits.' 6' Foster parents may notice an abnormal increase in screaming or
disobedience. 62 Yet the most typical response is intense confusion, sad-
ness, and grief.163 Children will continually ask about permanence and
when "things will return to normal."'164
Although visitation is crucial for reunification and maintenance of
the parent-child relationship, these purposes are not served in all
situations. They are not served when parents engage in behavior that
presents a risk of emotional or physical abuse. They are not served when
parents refuse to cooperate with visit supervisors in responding to the
child's needs. They are not served when parents are grossly inconsistent
with attending visits. And they are not served when parents are unable to
conceal their substance abuse or mental health deficiencies from their
children.
To ensure that the purposes of the Visitation Statute are properly
served, an amendment to the Statute is necessary. Not only can an
amendment mitigate the effect that harmful visits have on children, new
statutory language will empower courts to suspend or deny visitation
without subjecting children to months of harmful visits.
V. THE WASHINGTON VISITATION STATUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
STATUTE, JUDICIAL APPLICATION, AND APPELLATE INTERPRETATION
First, this Part first examines the former Visitation Statute, the
legislative history of the current Visitation Statute, and the juvenile
courts' application of the Statute. Second, to provide a better under-
standing of the legal interpretation of the Statute, this Part analyzes two
published decisions from the Washington State Court of Appeals: In re
Dependency of T.L.G. 165 and In re Dependency of TH.166 Finally, this
158. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
159. Id. In addition to fleeing the room or engaging in self-mutilation, Tommy would have a
physical reaction (such as a bowel movement) in response to visits with Mr. Goodall. See DSHS
Response, supra note 19, at 9.
160. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Smariga, supra note 127, at 15 ("Very young children cannot understand the separation,
and they tend to respond with bewilderment, sadness, and grief."); see also Interview with DSHS
Social Worker, supra note 113. According to the social worker, all dependent children-regardless
of the bond they have with their parents-are very confused about what is going to happen to them.
164. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
165. 139 Wash. App. 1, 156 P.3d 222 (2007).
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Part discusses the appellate court's unpublished decision in Tommy's
case. 167
A. The Legislative History and Plain Meaning of the Visitation Statute
The Washington legislature has long attempted to balance the rights
of parents and the rights of children in the dependency setting. This
attempt is shown by the legislature's history amending the Visitation
Statute.
In 2001, the legislature formed a committee-the Dependency and
Termination Equal Justice Committee ("DTEJ Committee")-to examine
specific problems arising in dependency and termination cases, including
visitation.' 68 In its report, the DTEJ Committee concluded that "visita-
tion is a key, critical issue for both parents and children and that
opportunities for visitation should be offered to the maximum extent pos-
sible." 169 The Committee made recommendations to change the former
version of the Visitation Statute, which provided:
The agency shall encourage the maximum parent and child and sib-
ling contact possible, including regular visitation and participation
by the parents in the care of the child while the child is in place-
ment. Visitation may be limited or denied only if the court deter-
mines that such limitation or denial is necessary to protect the
child's health, safety, or welfare. 170
First, the DTEJ Committee recommended that visitation be considered a
right of the family.' 7 1 Second, it recommended that visitation should not
be used as a sanction for a parent's failure to engage in court-ordered
services. 172 Third, it recommended "early, consistent and frequent visita-
tion."'
17 3
166. 139 Wash. App. 784, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007).
167. In re Dependency of C.N., No. 58799-4-I, 2007 WL 4489646, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
24, 2007).
168. S. 6643, 58th Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash. 2004); see also DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at iii.
These problem areas included court continuances, the appointment of experts, parents' access to
services, and visitation. The DTEJ Committee consisted of a multidisciplinary group of judges,
legislators, DSHS representatives, an assistant attorney general, parents' attorneys, court administra-
tors, a county commissioner, and other professionals involved in dependency and termination cases.
Id. at 1.
169. DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at iii.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2002) (amended 2004).
171. DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
172. Id. ("Suspension of visitation as a penalty for failing a urinalysis or failing to follow
through with other services that are not visitation-related is in derogation of the child's and parent's
right to consistent and frequent visitation."). It is important to note that the report fails to state that
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The legislature amended the Statute to reflect these three recom-
mendations. 174 First, the Statute was amended to prevent courts from
restricting visitation as punishment for parents who failed to comply with
court directives. 175 In the 2004 amended version, the Statute provided
that "visitation shall not be limited as a sanction ... where the health,
safety, or welfare of the child is not at risk as a result of the visitation.
' '176
The DTEJ Committee advocated this change because it contended that
limiting visitation as a sanction harms the child, and methods other than
suspending visitation could sufficiently protect the child's safety and
well-being. 77 Second, the legislature amended the Statute to instruct
juvenile courts to make visitation decisions based on the child's best
interest. 178 Third, the legislature added language that visitation was a
right of the family. 7 9
Although the legislature intended these changes to protect the best
interest of the child, the Statute has had the opposite effect in several
cases, including Tommy's dependency. First, the Visitation Statute does
not contain clear guidelines to juvenile courts for how to balance the
rights of parents and children. The origin of the problem stems from the
conflicting language in the Statute. The Statute begins by recognizing
that visitation is a right of the family and that parents and children should
have maximum contact. 80 Juvenile courts interpret this language as a
recognition of the right of parents to maximum visitation with their
dependent children. 181 Yet the Visitation Statute also provides that
visitation decisions should comport with the best interest of the child and
that visitation is not required when it conflicts with the child's health,
safety, or welfare. 182 The Visitation Statute does not, however, explain
how to properly balance the health and safety rights of children with the
parents' right to maximum visitation.
174. S. 6643, 58th Leg., 2d Sess. (Wash. 2004).
175. Id.
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008).
177. Wash. S. 6643. In testimony before the senate, persons testifying in support of the
amendment testified that sanctioning visitation was unnecessary because courts have other means of
sanctioning parents. See also DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19-22.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii). "Appropriate levels of visitation should be
determined for each family, taking into account their individualized circumstances, including the
bond and parental follow-through, among other factors, and consistent with the health, safety, and
welfare of the child." DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii). This language was influenced by the DTEJ
report, which noted that "visitation is the right of the family" and "extremely important to both the
child and the parent." DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
180. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii).
181. Id.; see also discussion infra Part V.B.
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii).
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Second, the sanction provision, as interpreted by the juvenile and
appellate courts, allows parents to continue visitation despite their failure
to address parental deficiencies that harm the child. 183 The sanction pro-
vision was a well-intentioned attempt to prevent unwarranted restrictions
on visitation and to ensure that courts would not limit visitation after a
parent missed a few appointments for services.184 But, when read in con-
junction with the earlier language requiring maximum visitation, juvenile
courts generally interpret this language as a broad restraint on its ability
to limit visitation. 185 As a result, children are often subjected to several
harmful visits before a juvenile court will find that the parent's noncom-
pliance with services is an actual risk to the child's health, safety, or
welfare. 86 Moreover, the appellate court's interpretation of the sanction
provision has tied the hands of juvenile court judges and has forced these
judges to allow harmful visitation to continue in order to prove that the
parent's noncompliance is directly related to the quality of visits. 187
Third, the Visitation Statute does not define a child's best interest
or explain when it is appropriate to suspend visitation. The current statu-
tory language instructs juvenile courts to make visitation decisions with
the health, safety, and welfare of the child in mind. 188 Yet "the health,
safety, and welfare of the child" language is a vague and meaningless
guide. As a result, juvenile courts have rendered visitation decisions in
an ad hoc fashion and all too often in the parent's favor.' 89
Without meaningful guidelines from the Visitation Statute, the
juvenile courts have struggled to apply the Statute in a consistent or pre-
183. See discussion infra Part V.B.-C.
184. DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 22 (noting that the suspension of visitation "should not
be imposed as sanctions to enforce service orders").
185. See, e.g., In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 156 P.3d 222 (2007). In T.L.G.,
the Washington Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court improperly denied visitation as a
"sanction" for the parents' noncompliance with services even though the juvenile court expressed
concern that the children were at risk of harm because the parents refused to address their parental
deficiencies for over four years. Id. at 9, 17-18, 156 P.3d at 226, 230-31.
186. Tommy, for example, suffered five additional months of abuse before the court felt free to
find that Mr. Goodall's noncompliance with services was directly related to the harmful nature of the
visits. See supra Part I; see also discussion infra Part V.B.
187. See discussion infra Part V.B.-C.
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008).
189. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113; see also, e.g., TL.G., 139 Wash.
App. 1, 156 P.3d 222 (holding that juvenile court should not have suspended visitation even though
the parents refused to seek treatment for anger and mental health problems; there was a documented
history of volatile visits; and during one visit, the parents became physical with visit supervisors and
threatened to hold the child hostage); In re Dependency of C.N., No. 58799-4-I, 2007 WL 4489646,
at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2007) (noting that the juvenile court permitted visitation for two
years even though the child demonstrated severe emotional and physical reactions to visits with his
father).
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dictable manner,190 and the judges often focus solely on the parents' right
to visitation. 19' Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals has failed
to clearly elucidate where parents' rights end and children's rights begin
in the visitation setting. 192 These differing outcomes have rendered the
Visitation Statute of little use in protecting the interests of children.
B. Application of the Visitation Statute at the Juvenile Court Level
The juvenile court is the key actor in determining the scope of a
visitation order; therefore, its application of the Visitation Statute is
instructive to determine whether the Statute is, in fact, protecting the best
interest of the child. It is no surprise, in light of the legislative history
and statutory language, that visitation orders focus on parents' rights.
93
When visits between the parent and child are emotionally damaging for
the child, the juvenile courts typically express reluctance in limiting or
denying visitation. 194 Instead, as in Tommy's case, 195 the courts often
issue "conditions" for the parents to abide by during visits.
196
Juvenile courts typically rely on two reasons to justify the
continuance of visitation. First, visitation brings about reunification.
97
The argument behind this justification is that without visitation parents
will not have an opportunity to correct parental deficiencies. The courts
often state that visits will improve with time and practice. Second, visi-
tation is an absolute right of the parents.
98
To suspend a visitation order, social workers generally must pro-
vide several accounts of actual harm that the child has suffered during
visitation. 99 Sadly, this requires putting the child through the emotional
harm of additional visits so that the social worker has more
"ammunition" for a later declaration supporting the Department's motion
seeking to restrict or deny visitation.2 °° Under the current Statute and its
190. For a discussion of the conflicting opinions in In re Dependency of T.L.G. and In re
Dependency of T.H., see infra Part V.C.2.iii.
191. See, e.g., T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 17, 156 P.3d at 230; Interview with DSHS Social
Worker, supra note 113. The court interpreted the 2004 amendments to the Visitation Statute as
"strengthen[ing] the parents' visitation rights and command[ing] the agency to encourage maximum
parent-child contact." T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 16-17, 156 P.3d at 230.
192. See discussion infra Part V.C. 1-2.
193. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113. This subpart of the Comment is
based on the experiences of a social worker with Children's Administration, a division of DSHS.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part 1.
196. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008) ("Early, consistent, and frequent visitation
is crucial for... making it possible for parents and children to safely reunify.").





application at the juvenile court level, the best interest of the child is not
adequately protected.
C. The Washington Appellate Court's
Interpretation of the Visitation Statute
Decisions from the Washington State Court of Appeals have failed
to provide more instructive interpretations of the Visitation Statute and in
fact, have muddied the waters. This section examines two recently pub-
lished decisions: In re Dependency of T.L.G. and In re Dependency of
TH.20 1 This section then examines the court's unpublished opinion in
Tommy's case. All three opinions have failed to sufficiently instruct the
juvenile courts on how to evaluate visitation issues and the best interest
of the child. Moreover, the "guidelines" that the court of appeals
provided in these decisions are likely to put children at further risk for
ongoing trauma and abuse during visitation with their parents.
1. In re Dependency of TL. G.
In 2007, the court of appeals decided In re Dependency of TL.G.2 °2
This case was the first to interpret the Visitation Statute as amended in
2004. The T.L.G. court's interpretation of the statute rendered the rights
and interests of children secondary to the rights of parents by finding that
there must be an "actual risk of harm" 203 before visits can be suspended.
Sadly, the facts of TL.G. indicate that the appellate court's requirement
of "actual risk of harm" means that there must be documented harm
during visits before juvenile courts may suspend visitation.20 4
i. Factual Background & Procedural History
Bonnie Dunlavy and William Gilfillen are the parents of T.L.G. and
C.L.G, °5 who were removed from their parents' care in August 2001.206
From the beginning of the dependency, visitation between the parents
and children was problematic. 0 7 Visit supervisors frequently reported to
201. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 156 P.3d 222 (2007); In re Dependency
ofT.H., 139 Wash. App. 784, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007).
202. TL.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 156 P.3d 222.
203. Id. at 17, 156 P.3d at 230.
204. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.iii.
205. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 4, 156 P.3d at 223.
206. Brief of Respondent at 1, T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 156 P.3d 222 (2007) (No. 57862-6-
1). The children were removed from Ms. Dunlavy and Mr. Gilfillen's care because the parents'
significant mental health and anger management problems placed the children at risk and rendered
the parents unable to care for the children's special needs. Id.
207. Id. at 2.
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the juvenile court that Ms. Dunlavy and Mr. Gilfillen were hostile and
verbally abusive to agency staff during visits with their children.2 °8
The juvenile court ultimately suspended visitation following a
particularly hostile visit that ended with police escorting Ms. Dunlavy
from the DSHS office.2 °9 On January 25, 2002, the parents became
antagonistic with the visit supervisor after learning that C.L.G. would not
be at the visit.210 While holding T.L.G., Ms. Dunlavy repeatedly yelled
at the social worker regarding their case and threatened to use the child
as a hostage.21' To prevent T.L.G. from witnessing her parents' inappro-
priate and aggressive behavior, the visit supervisor told the parents to
calm down or she would have to end the visit.212 The parents continued
to yell at the visit supervisor, who again instructed them to stop
discussing their complaints and the case in front of their child.21 3
When the parents refused to calm down, the visit supervisor called
a security guard to protect T.L.G. and to end the confrontation. Immedi-
ately, Mr. Gilfillen began yelling and physically attacking the security
guard.214 Meanwhile, Ms. Dunlavy tried several times to leave the visit
room with T.L.G.215 Concerned for T.L.G.'s safety, the social worker
assigned to the case intervened and successfully separated the crying and
frightened child from her out-of-control mother.21 6 Police arrived and
escorted Ms. Dunlavy from the DSHS office.217
Shortly after the visit, the juvenile court granted DSHS's motion to
suspend visitation.21 8 Although the parents did not request the reinstate-
ment of visitation until June 2005 (three years after the incident),21 9
DSHS continued to oppose visitation on the ground that the parents had
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 3. C.L.G. was not at this particular visit because of an illness. Id.
211. Id. During this visit, the parents claimed that they believed the visit supervisor was
feeding T.L.G. out of a dirty sippy-cup. Mr. Gilfillen also engaged in an argument with the visit





216. Id. The social worker arrived at the DSHS office shortly before the visit supervisor called
the security guard. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The parents did not file a response to DSHS's request to suspend visitation. Follow-
ing suspension of visitation, the parents did not ask the court to reinstate visits. In 2003, parental
rights were terminated. In March 2005, the termination orders were reversed and the case returned
to the juvenile court. See In re Dependency ofT.L.G., 126 Wash. App. 181, 108 P.3d 156 (2005).
219. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 4. Because the juvenile court could unilaterally
reinstate visitation without the parents' filing a request to restore visits, DSHS continued to voice its
opposition to visitation during review hearings. Id.
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yet to resolve their anger and mental health problems. 2   Both DSHS and
the GAL argued that the parents' behavior posed a substantial risk to the
health, safety, and welfare of the children. 21  The judge denied the
222parents' request to reinstate visitation. In his ruling, the judge opined:
Visitation's something we need to work for, but I think two things
need to occur. One, the children need to be prepared for it, and two,
the parents need to take some action to make it clear that they're
taking steps towards addressing the deficiencies that were identified
in the dependency previously ... but also that led to the suspension
of visits in January 2002 because of the actions of the parents. 223
The court denied two more requests to reinstate visitation between
August 2005 and May 2006,224 finding that the suspension of visitation
was proper and was not some "punishment" for the parents' noncompli-
ance with services. 22' Each time the court denied visitation, it justified
the decision on the grounds that visits would be contrary to the children's
best interests and that "there are problems here that need intervention
before these children can safely resume contact with their parents. 226
On May 30, 2006, Ms. Dunlavy and Mr. Gilfillen appealed, claiming that
the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying visitation. 27
ii. The Court of Appeals' Opinion
The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's suspension of
visitation as a violation of the parents' rights: first, the court held that the
parents were improperly denied visitation as a sanction for their
noncompliance with court-ordered services;228 second, the court held that
the juvenile court improperly denied visitation without a finding that
there was "actual harm" to the children.229
According to the court, the 2004 amendments to the Visitation
Statute were aimed at "strengthening parents' rights to visitation with
their dependent children., 230 The court held that because the Statute
requires the Department to encourage maximum parent and child contact
juvenile courts were prohibited from using visitation as a sanction for a
220. Id.
221. Id. at 4-5.
222. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 8-9, 156 P.3d 222, 226 (2007).
223. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 5.
224. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 9-13, 156 P.3d at 226-28.
225. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 6-7.
226. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 12, 156 P.3d at 228.
227. Id. at 14, 156 P.3d at 228.
228. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
229. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
230. Id. at 4, 156 P.3d at 223.
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parent's failure to comply with court orders or required services. 231 The
denial of visitation in this case, according to the court, was "difficult to
view as anything but a sanction" because the juvenile court, DSHS, and
witnesses repeatedly stated that visitation should not resume until each
parent made sufficient progress in court-ordered services.232
The court also held that the juvenile court's denial of visitation was
233
an abuse of discretion because there was no showing of actual harm.
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that the Visitation Statute
prevents juvenile courts from "limiting or denying visitation without a
showing of risk., 234 Thus, a juvenile court may properly restrict visita-
tion only when there is a showing of the "legislatively-mandated risk of
harm." In defining this risk, the court held that the risk of harm "must be
an actual risk, not speculation based on reports., 235 The court stated that
because the burden is on DSHS to encourage maximum parent-child
contact, 236 the Department bears the burden of proving that visitation
poses a "current concrete risk" to the children before visitation may be
suspended.237 The court concluded that there was no concrete risk of
harm when visits remained suspended based on "a single incident.,
238
iii. The Effect of In re Dependency of T.L.G.
With its decision in T.L.G., the court of appeals created a
presumption in favor of parents when determining the validity of
visitation orders. The court justified this presumption by its interpreta-
tion of the Statute's legislative history; according to the court, the
purpose of the 2004 amendments was to strengthen parents' rights.239
The TL.G. decision is troubling for three reasons. First, the court's deci-
sion that the juvenile court was merely sanctioning the parents for
noncompliance is inconsistent with the juvenile court proceedings. Sec-
ond, the court's decision improperly placed too much emphasis on the
rights of parents in the visitation setting. Third, the court's interpretation
of the sanction provision and requirement that juvenile courts find "ac-
tual risk of harm" before suspending visitation is inconsistent with the
231. Id. at 16, 156 P.3d at 229-30 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
233. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
234. Id. at 16-17, 156 P.3d at 230.
235. Id. When stating that the risk of harm may not be based on "reports," the court was
referencing the reports of the guardian ad litem, social worker, and anger management counselor.
All of these reports concluded that visitation would present a significant risk to the health, safety,
and welfare of the children. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 7-9.
236. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 17, 156 P.3d at 230.
237. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 230.
238. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 230.
239. Id. at 4, 156 P.3d at 223.
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intent of the Visitation Statute and places children at greater risk for
emotional or physical abuse.
First, the court's opinion ignores the realities of the case in T.L.G.
In its decision, the appellate court asserted that the juvenile court's
suspension of visitation could only be interpreted as a sanction.240 This
assertion is belied by the record. The juvenile court provided several
reasons for denying visitation: the troubling nature of the 2002 visit, the
history of visits demonstrating the parents' anger issues, and the parents'
consistent failure to address the problems that led to harmful visits in the
past.24' In suspending visitation, the juvenile court concluded that visita-
tion was not in the children's best interest.2
42
Although the appellate court correctly stated that visits may not be
suspended solely because of the parents' failure to comply with services,
it incorrectly stated that was the juvenile court's justification for
suspending visits between T.L.G. and her parents. On the contrary, the
juvenile court's oral rulings verify that the parents' anger and mental
health issues were tied directly to the troubling visits in the past:
So the fact that the parents are not fully engaged in services is not
just in and of itself reason to not have visitation as some form of
punishment. But I do believe that it does indicate that... there are
problems here that need intervention before these children can safe-
ly resume contact with their parents, and that hasn't occurred.43
The Visitation Statute allows juvenile courts to restrict visitation when a
parent's noncompliance with services is tied to a risk of harm to the child
and affects the quality of visits. 244 In this case, the juvenile court found
that the parents' consistent failure to address anger issues posed a risk of
harm to T.L.G. in 2002 and that this risk remained in 2006 because the
parents never sought treatment for their anger and mental health
issues.2 45 The appellate court's decision to reverse the suspension of
visitation was improper because the juvenile court was within its
discretion to protect the child's best interest.
Second, the court's opinion created a dangerous precedent by
holding that the intent of the Visitation Statute was to enhance parents'
rights. The court's presumption in favor of parents is contrary to the
240. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
241. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 5-9.
242. Id. at 6-7.
243. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
244. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008). The DTEJ Report also acknowl-
edges that restrictions on visits are appropriate when the "parent's actions [failure to show up to
visits or come to visits intoxicated] . . . raise . . . visitation-related issues and can cause children
anxiety and disappointment." DTEJ COMM., supra note 125, at 19.
245. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 6-7.
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overall intent of the Dependency Act. Although it is true that reunifica-
tion is the goal of dependency and that parents do indeed have a right to
visitation, the rights of children are paramount in the dependency proc-
ess.2 46 Section 13.34.020 of the Revised Code of Washington-the sec-
tion describing the purpose of the Dependency Act-provides that when
the rights of parents conflict with the rights of the child, "the rights and
safety of the child[ren] should prevail." 247 By holding that the
burden is on DSHS to prove that visitation poses a "current concrete
risk" to the child, 48 the appellate court improperly favored the rights of
parents over the rights of the child.
Lastly, the appellate court's decision ignored the realities of
dependency and created a dangerous precedent through its interpretation
of the sanction provision. The court's opinion failed to take into account
that children are dependent because of parental abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. 249 Maximizing visitation does not correct these problems;
services targeted at the parents' issues, on the other hand, do correct
these problems and do lead to parental improvement. By concluding that
visitation cannot be limited when parents fail to comply with services,
250
the appellate court ignored the inherent importance of services in the
visitation setting. Without compliance with services, several, if not all,
of the problems underlying the dependency action will not be corrected.
Parents who fail to address their deficiencies expose their children to the
same problems during visits that their children were exposed to before
being placed in foster care.
For instance, healthy visits between Tommy and his father were not
possible when Mr. Goodall failed to address his mental health issues.
25
'
When the juvenile court permitted visitation, Tommy was exposed to
additional emotional and physical harm during visits because of
Mr. Goodall's noncompliance with services.2  Healthy visits between
parents and children are contingent on the parents' compliance with
253
services.
The appellate court's requirement of current concrete risk and
actual risk of harm indicates that there must be documented harm to the
child-related to the parent's noncompliance-before a juvenile court
can properly suspend visitation. As the court's opinion indicates, one
246. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020.
247. Id.
248. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 18, 156 P.3d 222, 230 (2007).
249. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030(5)(a)-(c).
250. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 18, 156 P.3d 231.
25 1. See discussion supra Part I.
252. See discussion supra Part I.
253. Interview with DSHS Social Worker, supra note 113.
[Vol. 32:769
Putting Children Last
incident of harm is not enough to suspend visitation; 254 however, the
court failed to explain how much harm is enough. Thus, children like
Tommy are subjected to weeks, months, and possibly years of traumatiz-
ing visits before a juvenile court can properly suspend visitation under
the T.L.G. standard.
Although the appellate court's parental rights presumption has the
advantage of promoting family reunification through maximum visitation
and contact between the parent and child,255 the decision puts children at
too great a risk of suffering harm during visitation. Requiring DSHS to
present the court with an actual risk of harm256 or a current concrete
risk257 before the court can suspend visitation is too high of a standard
and does not adequately protect the best interests of children. An amend-
ment to the Visitation Statute is necessary to ensure that the health and
safety of children is the primary concern of juvenile courts when
rendering visitation decisions.
2. In re Dependency of T.H.
Later in 2007, the Washington Court of Appeals decided In re
Dependency of T.H.258 In T.H., the court's opinion was more consistent
with the intent of both the Visitation Statute and the Dependency Act by
recognizing the best interest of the child. The decision, however, fell
short of adequately protecting the best interest of the child because the




Ms. Hackney-Farias is the mother of T.H., a child found dependent
in November 2004. The juvenile court removed T.H. from Ms. Hack-
ney-Farias's care because she had "physically and verbally abused T.H.,
neglected T.H., and despite being aware that T.H. was being sexually
abused by her boyfriend's son, took limited actions to protect the
child., 260 Hackney-Farias's visits with T.H., both before and during the
dependency, were problematic. 261 She repeatedly told T.H. that he was
254. T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. at 18, 156 P.3d at 230.
255. Id. at 4, 156 P.3d at 223-24.
256. Id. at 18, 156 P.3d at 231.
257. Id at 18, 156 P.3d at 230.
258. In re Dependency of T.H., 139 Wash. App. 784, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007).
259. Id. at 794, 162 P.3d at 1145 ("[T]his court has stated that an express finding [that a visita-
tion limitation is necessary to protect the child's health, safety, or welfare] is not required if the
evidence supports the conclusion that visitation is harmful to the child." (emphasis added)).
260. Id. at 786, 162 P.3d at 1141-42.
261. Id. at 787, 162 P.3d at 1142.
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lying about the sexual and physical abuse,262 which would leave T.H.
extremely upset and distraught.263 Based on the troubling nature of these
visits, the juvenile court ordered no in-person visitation until the child
wanted to visit and the child's therapist supported visitation.264
During the review hearing in 2005, the juvenile court denied
in-person visitation because Ms. Hackney-Farias had not complied with
the court-ordered services or addressed the issues that gave rise to
problematic visits. 265 In each of five subsequent review hearings, the
court found that Ms. Hackney-Farias had failed to comply with services,
including individual counseling, and that the reinstatement of in-person
visitation was improper.266 The court indicated that in-person visitation
would not be reinstated until the social worker, the GAL, and the child's
therapist approved in-person visitation.267 Ms. Hackney-Farias's rights
to T.H. were finally terminated after a trial in 2006.268 She appealed the
termination, arguing that the juvenile court improperly restricted
visitation without expressly finding that visitation was contrary to the
child's health, safety, and welfare.269
ii. The Court of Appeals' Opinion
The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's restrictions on
visitation, holding that the restrictions were necessary to protect T.H.27°
The court noted that the juvenile court had restricted visitation not to
sanction Ms. Hackney-Farias's noncompliance with services but to
protect T.H. from harm. 271 Additionally, the court stated that the evi-
dence on the record supported the juvenile court's imposed restrictions
on visitation: "[Ms.] Hackney-Farias's parenting deficiencies that had led
to harmful prior visitation had not been remedied through services.' 272
In particular, Ms. Hackney-Farias had not participated in a psychiatric
evaluation, anger management classes, or counseling.273
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. Shortly following visitation, the mother obtained T.H.'s email address and sent him
messages blaming him for the dependency. Id.
265. Id. at 788, 162 P.3d at 1142. In addition to finding that Ms. Hackney Farias had not
complied with anger management or counseling services, the court noted: "Therapist does not rec-
ommend or support visitation at this time. Mother has engaged in internet instant messaging and
email contact with child, but has made inappropriate comments." Id.
266. Id. at 788-89, 162 P.3d at 1142-43.
267. Id. at 788, 162 P.3d at 1143.
268. Id. at 789, 162 P.3d at 1143.
269. Id. at 792, 162 P.3d at 1145.
270. Id. at 797, 162 P.3d at 1147.
271. Id. at 796, 162 P.3d at 1146-47.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 788-89, 162 P.3d at 1142-43.
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The appellate court further held that the Visitation Statute does not
require an express finding that denying or limiting visitation is necessary
to protect the child's health, safety, or welfare "if the evidence supports
the conclusion that visitation is harmful to the child., 274 The juvenile
court primarily relied on the following evidence: (1) the juvenile court's
findings that Ms. Hackney-Farias had not corrected her parental
deficiencies and was not in a position to resume visitation without
causing further damage to T.H; (2) Ms. Hackney-Farias's noncompliance
with services, including anger management and counseling; and (3) the
recommendations of the psychological evaluator that visitation would
likely cause further damage to T.H.275 The appellate court concluded
that this evidence justified the juvenile court's suspension of in-person
276visitation.
iii. The Effect of In re Dependency of T.H.
The appellate court's decision in TH. is important for two reasons.
On the one hand, when compared with the earlier decision in TL. G, the
court's interpretation of the Visitation Statute is more properly focused
on the best interest of the child. On the other hand, however, the TH.
court embraces the T.L.G. court's ambiguous requirement of "evidence"
of harm. Thus, the T.H. opinion is troubling because it will encourage
juvenile courts to put children in abusive and unhealthy visitation set-
tings in order to develop an adequate record to justify suspending
visitation.
Although the court's decision in TL.G. clearly supported the paren-
tal rights doctrine, the TH. opinion seemed be more focused on the best
interest of the child. Unlike the TL.G. court, which did not give any
credence to reports by medical professionals, 277 the T.H. court recognized
that it was appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the opinions of
the psychologists involved in the case.271 Additionally, the T.H. court
274. Id. at 794, 162 P.3d at 1145 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 795-96, 162 P.3d at 1146.
276. Id. at 797, 162 P.3d at 1147.
277. In re Dependency of T.L.G., 139 Wash. App. 1, 17, 156 P.3d 222, 230 (2007). In T.L.G.,
the juvenile court used the reports of a psychologist recommending no visitation between the parents
and the children as an additional basis for the suspension of visitation. The appellate court, however,
did not give credence to these reports.
278. T.H., 139 Wash. App. at 795, 162 P.3d at 1146. In suspending in-person visitation, the
juvenile court seriously considered the recommendations of the psychological evaluator:
I also think that the psychological evaluator is right to have serious reservations about
Ms. Hackney-Farias'[s] ability to parent this child given their history and given the prob-
lems and given her lack of insight to date, and that raises concerns for me, not only for
Ms. Hackney-Farias and whether she's really in a position to appreciate the problems that
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indicated that it was appropriate for the juvenile court to look at the
mother's progress in correcting the deficiencies that led to the suspension
of visits-including her compliance with services. 279 By allowing juve-
nile court judges to consider these additional factors, visitation orders are
more likely to protect a child's best interest.
Even though the T.H. court took a positive step towards recognizing
the best interest of the child, the opinion is troubling because it fails to
provide a clear definition of how much evidence is sufficient to warrant a
restriction or suspension of visitation. 280 This Comment does not advo-
cate that juvenile courts should be allowed to restrict or deny visitation
without some basis for believing that visits are not in the child's best
interest. But the current requirement of evidence of harm or concrete
risk as advocated by the courts in T.L.G. and TH. is equally misguided in
that its ambiguity renders it useless. This evidentiary requirement is like-
ly to subject children to harm just to create a sufficient record.
The factual backgrounds of these two cases demonstrate the
ambiguity of this evidentiary requirement. On one hand, the juvenile
court in TL.G. had insufficient evidence to suspend visitation when the
parents had a long history of volatile visits that included a particularly
troubling visit that involved a physical altercation, threats to hold the
child hostage, and attempts to flee the DSHS office with the child.
2 81
Moreover, the parents in T.L. G. refused to address their anger and mental
health issues over a period of three years, and the court had received
reports from the GAL, a social worker, and an anger management coun-
selor advising that visitation should be denied.2 82 On the other hand, the
juvenile court in TH. had sufficient evidence to suspend in-person
visitation when the mother had a history of verbally abusing T.H. during
visits; she was not complying with anger management or individual
counseling; and the psychological evaluator reported that visitation was
inappropriate.283 Although it is clear that the appellate court requires
some showing that visitation has harmed the child or would be a risk to
the child, the amount or the type of evidence needed is never explained.
caused the court to suspend supervised visits in the first place but also whether or not
she's really in a position to resume them without causing further damage to T.H.
Id. at 795, 162 P.3d at 1146.
279. Id. at 795, 162 P.3d at 1146.
280. See id. at 795, 162 P.3d at 1146. Nowhere in the court's opinion does it explain how
much evidence is enough. Instead, the court stated merely: "Hackney-Farias's parenting deficiencies
that had led to harmful prior visitation had not been remedied through services." Id. at 796, 162 P.3d
at 1146-47.
281. See discussion supra Part V.C.I .i.
282. Brief of Respondent, supra note 206, at 5-8.
283. TH., 139 Wash. App. at 795-96, 162 P.3d at 1146.
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Moreover, the appellate court failed to clearly explain the factual and
legal distinction between TH. and T.L.G.
Given the uncertainty of how much evidence is enough to suspend
visitation, the opinions in T.H. and TL. G. will encourage juvenile courts
to allow harmful visits to continue in order to create a record immune
from reversal by the appellate court. By amending the language in the
Visitation Statute, the legislature can avoid the unnecessary injury that
results from this evidentiary standard.
3. In re Dependency of C.N.
In 2007, the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the juvenile
court's decision to suspend visitation between Tommy and Mr. Goodall
to determine whether visitation had been improperly denied as a sanction
for Mr. Goodall's noncompliance with court-ordered services.284 The
court held that the suspension of visitation was, in fact, proper to protect
Tommy's health, safety, and welfare.285 In reaching its decision, the
court noted that "the record overwhelmingly support[ed] the court's con-
clusion that Goodall's visitations with [Tommy] were physically harmful
and emotionally traumatic. 286
The appellate court also reaffirmed its holdings in TL.G. and T.H.
that visitation may not be restricted as a sanction for noncompliance with
287
services. In concluding that visitation had not been suspended as a
sanction, the court noted that "Goodall's participation and progress in
mental health treatment was directly related to the quality of Goodall's
visits and the health, safety, and welfare of [Tommy]. 288 The court held
that suspension of visitation is proper when a parent's noncompliance
with services "directly relate[s]" to the quality of visits.28 9
Although the court found that the suspension of visitation was
proper, its opinion is concerning for two reasons. First, the court contin-
ued to emphasize that the record must overwhelmingly demonstrate that
visitation would harm the child.29 ° In this case, two years of harmful
visits was sufficient evidence, in the appellate court's mind, to affirm the
juvenile court's suspension of visitation. Requiring overwhelming evi-
284. In re Dependency of C.N., No. 58799-4-I, 2007 WL 4489646, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
24, 2007). Although unpublished decisions have no binding precedential value, this case is analyzed
in this Comment because the court's analysis and holding has likely played a role in the juvenile
courts' application of the Visitation Statute.
285. Id. at *5.
286. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at *5.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *4.
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dence, particularly if it means that a child must endure two years of
abuse to sufficiently develop the record, is inconsistent with protecting
the best interest of the child.
Second, the court's interpretation of the sanction provision
remained inconsistent with protecting the child's best interest. Although
the appellate court recognized that Mr. Goodall's participation in mental
health treatment was a requirement for successful visitation,291 the court
again failed to provide clear guidelines for when noncompliance with
services is sufficiently related to visitation to warrant restriction or
suspension of visits. The court merely stated that Goodall's noncompli-
ance was "directly related" to the quality of visits. 292 The court failed to
explain what types of services are directly related to quality visits or the
duration of noncompliance required before visitation can be properly
restricted or suspended. Again, this holding seems to indicate that visita-
tion may be restricted or denied only when there is overwhelming
evidence before the court.
It is not in the best interest of children to subject them to potentially
harmful visitation just to create a record with overwhelming evidence of
harm.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Visitation Statute should be amended given the ambiguity con-
tained in the language of the Statute, the problematic opinions rendered
by the Washington Court of Appeals, and the juvenile courts' practice of
continuing visitation despite ongoing harm to the child. Changes to the
Statute should accomplish the following goals: (1) safeguarding the long-
term best interest of the child; (2) reducing the opportunities for parents
to subject their children to emotional harm in the visitation setting; and
(3) providing clear guidelines for juvenile courts to use when making
visitation decisions.
To accomplish these objectives, the Visitation Statute should
expressly indicate that visitation is a conditional right of the family and a
collaborative endeavor between all parties involved in a dependency.
Further, the legislature should rephrase the sanction provision to better
protect the best interests of children and to encourage parents to satisfy
their obligation to correct parental deficiencies that affect visitation.
Finally, the Statute should define "best interest of the child" to help
juvenile courts make visitation decisions that are consistent with the
child's health, safety, welfare, and interests.




Given that the courts have been unable to create a clear standard
and that children are continually forced to participate in unhealthy and
traumatic visitation, the legislature should amend the Statute so that it
serves its original goal of protecting children. In relevant part, the
Amended Statute would provide:
Visitation is a conditional right of parents and children, in cases in
which visitation is in the best interest of the child. Visitation is a
collaborative endeavor between the parents, child, caseworkers, the
court, lawyers, and service providers, and all these individuals
and/or entities must work together to ensure that visits meet the
attachment, emotional, and safety needs of the child. The court
shall grant the appropriate level of visitation between parent and
child and sibling based on the health, safety, welfare, and best inter-
est of the child. The court has discretion to limit or deny visitation
if the parent's noncompliance with services has harmed the child or
if the court deems it necessary to protect the child's health, safety,
or welfare.
To ensure that the restriction or denial of visitation is not a sanction
for the parent's noncompliance with services, the court shall base its
decision on at least two of the conditions below:
1. Prior harmful visits between the parent(s) and the child that
are a result of the parent(s)'s noncompliance with services.
Services that will warrant the attention of the court are: drug
and alcohol treatment, mental health counseling, domestic
violence treatment; anger management, and other services that
improve the parent(s)'s interaction with the child;
2. Recommendations of service providers that visitation is not
appropriate;
3. The child's requests to restrict visitation;
4. Recommendations of social workers, and the parent(s)'s fail-
ure to address parental deficiencies; and
5. Continued visitation would be contrary to the child's health,
safety, welfare, or best interest.
In determining whether visitation is in the best interest of the child,
the court should consider the following factors: the relative strength,
nature, and stability of the child's relationship with the parent(s);
the parent(s)'s performance of parenting functions during visitation;
the wishes of the child; the interaction between the parent(s) and the
child; the recommendations of service providers and social workers;
the mental health and/or substance abuse of the parent(s); and
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history of physical violence, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and
threats of abduction.
A. Visitation: A Conditional Right of the Family
and Collaborative Endeavor
The Visitation Statute should be amended to guarantee that
visitation is granted or restricted to safeguard the long-term best interest
of the child, not to protect parents' right to visit. This can be achieved by
amending the opening language of the Statute to indicate that visitation is
not an absolute, unconditional right of the family.
The first three sentences of the Visitation Statue should be amended
to provide the following:
Visitation is a conditional right2 93 of parents and children, in cases
in which visitation is in the best interest of the child. Visitation is a
collaborative endeavor294 between the parents, child, caseworkers,
the court, lawyers, and service providers, and all individuals and/or
entities must work together to ensure that visits meet the attach-
ment, emotional, and safety needs of the child. The court shall
grant the appropriate level of visitation between parent(s) and child
and sibling based on the health, safety, welfare, and best interest of
the child.
By adding the word "conditional," the legislature will send the message
to the juvenile courts that visitation orders should not be determined
under the mindset that visitation is an absolute right of the parent.
Rather, this new language will help courts make visitation orders that are
truly in the child's best interest.
In addition, the "collaborative endeavor" language will encourage
courts to evaluate the opinions of all parties involved in a dependency,
including social workers and service providers. 296 This comprehensive
293. See Smariga, supra note 127, at 7. This proposed amendment was influenced by Smari-
ga's article; however, the amendment to the sanction provision would likely be interpreted as a
departure from her recommendations. In her article, Smariga advocates that courts find "substantial
evidence" before limiting visitation. Id. This Comment does not advocate such a heightened evi-
dentiary standard.
294. See id
295. This sentence replaces the following sentence: "The agency shall encourage the maximum
parent and child and sibling contact possible, when it is in the best interest of the child, including
regular visitation and participation by the parents in the care of the child while the child is in place-
ment." WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (2008).
296. See Smariga, supra note 127, at 9. According to Smariga,
When there is any doubt about the safety or benefit of visitation, there should be thorough
assessments of the child, the parent(s), and the relationship between the child and parent
(known as an attachment assessment). Mental health clinicians can provide important
information to attorneys and the court about what is in a child's best interest.
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approach is more likely to yield visitation decisions that protect the
child's best interest. Under the former language, children were vulner-
able to visitation decisions improperly based on the parents' right to visit.
Further, the "appropriate level of visitation" language will guide
courts to enter visitation orders that better protect the interests of the
child. Under the current version of the Statute, the "maximum parent
and child ... contact" language encourages juvenile courts to make
visitation decisions based largely on considerations of the parents' rights.
Although the Statute instructs courts to make visitation decisions that are
in the child's best interest, the "maximum visitation" language invites
courts to be hesitant in restricting visitation.
This amendment would not unduly restrict the rights of parents for
two reasons. First, even the plain meaning of the current Visitation
Statute does not give parents an unfettered right to visitation: "Visitation
is a right of the family ... in cases in which visitation is in the best inter-
est of the child. 29 7 Moreover, parents with dependent children have
been deemed unfit; thus, the state has a greater interest in intervening in
the parent-child relationship to protect the child's best interest. 298 The
state's parens patriae power does not end once the child is taken into the
state's custody. Rather, the state has an ongoing interest to protect the
child and to promote the child's interests.299 For this reason, it is proper
to condition visitation on the best interest of the child, including for the
protection of the child's health, safety, and welfare.
Second, the Dependency Act expressly provides that when the
rights of parents and the rights of children are in conflict, the rights of
children are paramount. 30 0  This suggested amendment does not limit
parents' right to visitation any more than the current version; the
Dependency Act currently provides that the rights of children must
prevail. The purpose of this language is to more clearly elucidate that the
rights of children should be the primary consideration.
B. Amending the Sanction Provision
Given the appellate court's decisions in TL.G, TIH., and C.N., it is
also necessary to amend the sanction provision of the Visitation Statute
Id. This amendment was influenced by Smariga's article and is included to encourage juvenile
courts to evaluate the opinions of all interested and involved parties before rendering a visitation
decision.
297. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.136(2)(b)(ii) (granting visitation only when it is in the best
interest of the child).
298. See discussion supra Part II. B.
299. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020 (noting that the child's health and safety shall be the
paramount concern when the state carries out its duties under the Dependency Act).
300. See id.
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to ensure that children are not subjected to abusive visits in order to cre-
ate an adequate record. In particular, the Statute should be amended to
give the court discretion to limit or deny visitation if the parent's non-
compliance with services has harmed the child or if it is necessary to
protect the child's health, safety, or welfare. Further, the Statute should
be amended to provide guidelines for the court to use in restricting visita-
tion. To ensure that the restriction or denial of visitation is not merely a
sanction for the parent's noncompliance with services, the court shall
base its decision on any two of the following:
1. Prior harmful visit(s) between the parent(s) and child that are a
result of the parent(s)'s noncompliance with services.
Services that will warrant the attention of the court are: drug
and alcohol treatment, mental health counseling,
domestic violence treatment, anger management, and other
services that improve the parent(s)'s interaction with the child;
2. Recommendations of service providers that visitation is not
appropriate;
3. The child's requests to restrict visitation;
4. Recommendations of social workers, and the parent(s)'s
failure to address parental deficiencies; and
5. Continued visitation would be contrary to the child's health,
safety, welfare, or best interest.
This amendment will better protect the interests of children by
affording courts greater discretion in limiting visitation. Under this new
language, courts would have discretion to suspend visitation after one
particularly harmful visit-assuming the presence of at least one other
condition. Children like Tommy would not have to be subjected to
months or years of harmful visitation so that courts could obtain over-
whelming evidence to justify the suspension of future visits. Moreover,
by providing the five criteria set out above, the Statute would provide
juvenile courts with a guide to determine the amount and type of
evidence needed to restrict or suspend visitation.
This amended language would not give courts the opportunity to
merely sanction parents for noncompliance without a showing of
any harm or risk of harm to the child. By requiring two of the above
conditions, courts would have to justify the suspension of visitation on
more than just a parent's noncompliance with services. Moreover, this
amended language would allow courts to follow the recommendations of
service providers, social workers, and GALs if deemed relevant. This
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new language is of particular importance because these persons are
involved in the case on a daily basis and have a better appreciation of
whether visitation is indeed appropriate.
The amendment would not forever deprive parents of their right
to visitation. Rather, visitation would resume upon a showing by the
parents that they have substantially complied with services and corrected
the problems that resulted in the restriction of visitation. If parents are
allowed to continue to visit with their children and subject them to
emotional harm without consequence, then they will have no motivation
to seek help in correcting those deficiencies.
C. Defining "Best Interest of the Child"
Given that the best interest of the child is a vague and amorphous
phrase, the Visitation Statute should be amended to include its definition.
Such an amendment would enable courts to make visitation decisions
that better serve the interests of the child.
The best interest guidelines utilized by courts deciding child
custody matters are a useful comparison tool given the similar policy
interest of protecting the welfare of children. Family courts are accus-
tomed to dealing with the best interest of the child standard because the
judges are often required to consider the best interest of the child when
determining which parent will be the primary custodian and when
creating the visitation plan for the noncustodial parent. 30 1 In determining
parenting plans, these courts examine the relative strength, nature, and
stability of the child's relationship with the parent; the parent's perform-
ance of parenting functions; the wishes of the child; the interaction
between the parent and the child; the mental health and/or substance
abuse of all individuals involved; and history of physical violence, phys-
ical abuse, sexual abuse, and threats of abduction.3 °2 In the custody
setting, the first factor-"the relative strength, nature, and stability of the
child's relationship with each parent"-is given the greatest weight.30 3
The Visitation Statute should be amended to provide a definition of
the child's best interest in line with the factors used in child custody
matters. Providing factors will assist courts in making visitation
decisions that are more consistent with the child's best interest. These
factors demand that the court make child-centric decisions rather than
decisions that focus on the parents' right to visitation.
301. See In re Parentage of J.H., 112 Wash. App. 486, 49 P.3d 154 (2002).
302. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)(i)-(vii).
303. Id.
304. See supra Part V1 for the amendment to the best interest of the child provision.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Tommy's experience 30 5 demonstrates how dependent children are
vulnerable to abuse in the visitation setting. The consequences of visita-
tion under the Visitation Statute are considerable for many dependent
children.3 °6 The rights and interests of children are often undermined in
visitation orders because of the ambiguous statutory language, the juve-
nile courts' distaste for suspending visitation, and the appellate court's
creation of heightened evidentiary burdens. Although visitation is
crucial for reunification and maintenance of the parent-child relation-
ship, these purposes are not served when a parent's inappropriate
behavior subjects the child to increased emotional or physical abuse.
If this Comment's recommendations had been in place during the
course of Tommy's dependency, he would not have been subjected to
years of additional emotional and physical harm to justify a suspension
of visitation. The juvenile court would have suspended Mr. Goodall's
visits with Tommy sooner if the Statute had provided guidelines for
determining when a parent's noncompliance with services negatively
affected the quality of visits. Moreover, the proposed language regarding
"visitation as a conditional right" and a definition of "best interest of the
child" would have better instructed the juvenile court to consider the
child's rights before considering the parent's right to continued
visitation.
The Visitation Statute should be amended to reflect the
Dependency Act's commitment to protecting the best interest of the
child. Dependent children have a fundamental right not to be victimized
by their parents. By improving the current law, the Washington
legislature can ensure that visitation abuse ends.
305. See discussion supra Part I.
306. See discussion supra Part IV.
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